My research focuses on Social Choice Theory (in particular with axiomatic approaches on justice theory or voting theory).
Recently I have turned my research to Social Networks.


Publications:

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            In this paper, the set of outcomes of game forms is introduced as the relevant attribute for evaluating freedom of choice. These sets are defined as the cartesian product of every individual’s set of available options. It is argued that doing so is one way of taking into account social interactions when evaluating individual freedom. A set of axioms is introduced that convey some intuitions about how interactions affect freedom of choice, axioms by the mean of which two criteria, the Max and the MaxMin, are characterised for comparing game forms in terms of the freedom of choice they offer. These criteria are based, respectively, on the comparison of the best and theworst outcome the individual can reach in the game form             Hide Abstract

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Working Papers:

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