My research focuses on Social Choice Theory (in particular with axiomatic approaches on justice theory or voting theory).
Recently I have turned my research to Social Networks.
Publications:
- Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Conception of Similarity: an Axiomatic Approach, with N. Gravel - Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 53, n.3, pp 259-273, 2007
Abstract
- Freedom of Choice in a Social Context : Comparing Game Forms, Social Choice and Welfare,
Vol. 29, n.2, pp 295-315, 2007
Abstract
- De la manipulation des élections indirectes with V. Merlin - Revue Economique, Vol. 58, n.3, pp 767-777, 2007
Abstract
Working Papers:
- Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies, with V. Merlin – UFAE and IAE working paper n° 669.06 (2nd round International Journal of Game Theory )
This paper is devoted to the
analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving
two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every
jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some
aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects
the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final
winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change
jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the
result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a
paretian condition on every jurisdiction’s voting rule, it is shown
that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps
voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors
necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity
on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next
provided in the case of two candidates. Hide Abstract
- An Axiomatic Approach to Control over Outcomes in an Interactive Setting, UFAE and IAE working paper nº 704.07 (conditionally accepted in Theory and Decision)
Abstract