Kirman, A., GREQAM/EHESS, Marseille, France Zimmermann, J.-B., GREQAM/EHESS, Marseille, France (Eds.)

2001. IX, 343 pp. Softcover ISBN 3-540-42209-9

This book analyses situations in which individual agents, who might be different from each other, interact and produce behaviour on the aggregate level which does not correspond to that of the average actor. This leads to aggregate outcomes which would be impossible to explain in a more standard approach. Aggregation generates structure and, as a result, interaction and heterogeneity can be handled and we no longer have to rely on the over-simplified reduction of the behaviour of the economy to that of a "rational" individual.

Keywords: Interaction ; Heterogeneity ; Aggregation ; Social Structure ; Social Networks

Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. VOL. 503

Economics: Beyond the Millennium contains articles by leading authorities in various fields of economic theory and econometrics. Each contributor gives an account of the current state of the art in their own field and indicates the direction that they think it will take in the next ten years. The book is split into three sections: the microfoundations of macroeconomics, markets and organization, and econometrics, with highlights including Malinvaud on resource allocation, Van Damme on game theory, and Gourieroux on econometric modelling.

Contributors :

• Alan P. Kirman, Louis-André Gérard-Varet, and Michèle Ruggiero: Introduction
• Part I Microeconomic Foundations of Macroeconomics
• Phillippe Michel: Introduction to Part I
• 1 Alan P. Kirman: The Evolution of Economic Theory
• 2 Edmond Malinvaud: The Theory of Prices and Resource Allocation
• 3 Werner Hildenbrand: On the Empirical Content of Economic Theories
• 4 Jacques Drèze and Heraklis Polemarchakis: Money and Monetary Policy in General Equilibrium
• 5 Patrick Artus: Endogenous Growth: Which Are the Important Factors?
• Part II Markets and Organization
• Margaret E. Slade: Introduction to Part II
• 6 Jean J. Gabszewicz: General Equilibrium Economics: Allowing for Imperfect Competition
• 7 Clause d'Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, and Louis-André Gérard-Varet: Imperfect Competition and General Equilibrium: A New Approach
• 8 Suzanne Scotchmer and Jacques-François Thisse: Space and Value
• 9 Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Hervé Tanguy: The Future of Managerial Economics
• 10 Eric van Damme: Game Theory: The Next Stage
• Part III Issues in Econometrics
• Russell Davidson: Introduction to Part III
• 11 Cristian Gourieroux: Econometric Modelling: Methodologies and Interpretations
• 12 Agustin Maravall: Short-Term Analysis of Macroeconomic Time Series
• 13 Luc Bauwens and Michel Lubrano: Trends and Breaking Points in the Bayesian Econometric Literature
• 14 Richard Blundell: Microeconometrics: The Large Data Set Revolution
• Index

Edited by Mauro Gallegati, Professor of Economics, University of Teramo, Italy and Alan Kirman, Professor of Economics, GREQAM, University of Marseille III, France

Contents: Introduction 1. Interaction and Market 2. Tutorial on Social Interaction Economics 3. Multilevel Interactions with a Keynesian Flavour in a Stochastic Macroeconomic Model 4. Economic Theory and ‘Conformism’ 5. Firms’ Size and Monetary Policy 6. Agents’ Heterogeneity and Coordination Failure 7. Compartmental Analysis of Economic Systems with Heterogeneous Agents 8. Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Heterogeneous Agents 9. Fluctuations and Growth Due to Technological Innovation and Diffusion 10. Hysteresis and Economics 11. An Insider-Outsider Model with Non-Trivially Heterogeneous Labour Force 12. Agents’ Heterogeneity, Financial Fragility, and Learning Index
Contributors: P.G. Ardeni, G.I. Bischi, D. Delli Gatti, F. Fiorillo, E. Gaffeo, M. Gallegati, A. Kirman, T. Luzzati, D. Mignacca, A. Palestrini, A. Santacroce, S. Staffolani

by A. P. Kirman (Editor), / Hardcover / Published 1998

Description : This book has its origins in a previous volume by the same authors, ``Introduction to Equilibrium Analysis''. Within the context of the exchange economy two solutions or themes proposed by Walras and Edgeworth are developed. The first consists of finding those allocations obtained through the decentralization of the choices of individuals by prices. The second, of allocations which are not objected to coalitions by individuals. This volume should be suitable for final year undergraduate courses or for graduate students. A thorough understanding of the material treated here will be invaluable to the reader in appreciating the economic literature. In particular, he will learn to treat with caution many of the assertions found in that literature.

Contents :
Introduction.
Exchange Economies.
Existence of Competitive Equilibrium.
The Core of a Game.
Core and Competitive Equilibria.
Structure, Uniqueness and Stability.
Mathematical Appendices.

Frontiers of Game Theory

The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993.

ISBN : 0-262-02356-3

Les contributeurs de ce volume sont :

• Steve Alpern (LES, UK)
• David Austen-Smith (U. Rochester, USA)
• Michael Bacharach (Oxford, UK)
• Ken Binmore (Michigan, USA)
• Steven J. Brams (New York, USA)
• Vincent Brousseau (EUI, Florence)
• Colin F Camerer (Chicago, USA)
• Hans Carlsson (U. of Lund, Suède)
• Alan Kirman (EUI et GREQAM)
• Michael Maschler (Jerusalem, Israël)
• Hervé Moulin (Duke U., USA)
• Jos Potters (Nijmegen, Pays-Bas)
• Talia Rymon (Wharton, USA)
• Larry Samuelson (Wisconsin, USA)
• Sankar Sen (Wharton, USA)
• Piero Tani (Florence, Italie)
• Stef Tijs (U. of Nijmegen (Pays-Bas)
• Morton D. Davis (City C. of new York, USA)
• Françoise Forges (CNRS, CORE, (Belgique)
• Joseph Greenberg (CRDE, McGill U., Montréal)
• Peter J. Hammond (Stanford U., USA)
• John C. Harsanyi (Berkeley, USA)
• Alain Haurie (Genève, Suisse)
• Eric J. Johnson (Wharton, USA)
• D. Marc Kilgour, (Wilfrid Laurier U., Canada)
• Eric van Damme (Tilburg U. Pays-Bas)
• Shlomo Weber (SMU Dallas, USA)

Learning and Rationality in Economics

Blackwell Publishers , 1995.

Comment les agents apprennent à connaître l'environnement économique dans lequel ils opèrent et le comportement des autres participants ? Ce thème qui a connu un intérêt considérable dans la littérature récente en micro-économie est le sujet de ce livre, le premier dans le champ.

La première partie du livre présente un état de l'art sur les différentes approches de cette question. On y aborde l'évolution des divers types de comportement, l'apprentissage Bayésien, la rationalité limitée et considère les conséquences du processus d'apprentissage du point de vue d'un individu ou d'un groupe social. La deuxième partie analyse différents aspects du processus d'apprentissage et leurs implications pour l'activité économique.

1. What has the Rational Learning Literature Taught Us?: L. Blume & D. Easley.

2. Savage-Bayesian Models of Economics: N. Kiefer & Y. Nyarko.

3. On Adaptive Learning in Strategic Games: R. Narimon & E. McGrattan.

4. Adaptive Learning and Expectational Stability: G. Evans & S. Honkapohja.

5. Learning in Oligopoly: Theory, Simulation and Experimental Evidence: A. Kirman.

6. Speed of Convergence of Recursive Least Squares: Learning with Autoregressive Moving-Average Perceptions.

7.Increasing Social Returns, Learning and Bifurcation Phenomena: G. Evans & S. Honkapohja.

8. Bounded Rationality and Learning; Procedural Learning: M. Salmon.

9. Learning and Reputation in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: D. Canning.

10. Learning and Social Equilibrium in Large Populations: D. Canning.

11. Evolution and Rationality in Competitive Markets: L. Blume & D. Easley.

12. Evolutionary Selection and Rational Behaviour: A. Banerjee & J. Weibull.

13. Equilibrium Selection through Adaption and Experimentation: H. Young.